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A RETURN TO UNCERTAINTY IN INDIAN AFFAIRS:




In the wake of the Constitutional Convention of 1787, James Madison
could correctly proclaim that uncertainty had been eliminated in the legal
relationship between Indians and non-Indians.' The five-word Indian
Commerce Clause2 - "and with the Indian Tribes" - was tacked on to the
constitutional grant of congressional power "[t]o regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States."3 These five words answered
four decades of questions about the reach of the states' authority over Indian
relations and affairs. That answer, as events of that time made clear and as
the Supreme Court confirmed in 1832 with its landmark opinion in Worcester
v. Georgia,4 was that states had no authority over commerce with the Indians.
The Indian Commerce Clause committed power over relations between
Indians and non-Indians exclusively to the federal government
If Madison were alive today, he could not proclaim the same. The
Supreme Court, having long since departed from "the conceptual clarity" of
the Worcester approach,6 has resurrected a state of confusion regarding just
how far states can exert their authority over Indian affairs. In a series of cases
employing a "particularized inquiry" approach to resolve disputes over
attempts by states to tax and regulate Indian relations with non-Indians, the
Court has arrived at an extremely fact-specific standard, with often
inconsistent results
* Law clerk, Chief Judge Harry T. Edwards, United States Court of Appeals, District of
Columbia Circuit. J.D., 1994, Georgetown University Law Center, B.A., 1987, Oregon State
University. I would like to thank Reid Peyton Chambers for his invaluable service as a sounding
board for many of the ideas expressed in this article. I also would like to thank Jennifer Searle
for her fine grammatical contributions. Finally, and always, I am grateful to my wife, Karen, for
her patience and support.
First place winner, 1993-94 American Indian Law Review Writing Competition.
I. See THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 268-69 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
3. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1-2.
4. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
5. Id. at 561.
6. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973).
7. See, e.g., White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
8. Compare id. (finding comprehensive federal regulation of tribal timber harvesting
activities to preclude application of state taxes to non-Indian logging contractor) with Cotton
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1994
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW
In so doing, the Court has dismantled the Framers' work. Certainly, the
Court has abandoned the Framers' understanding that the Indian Commerce
Clause would serve as an independent barrier to the application of state law
to Indian affairs But the Court's failure to honor the Framers' plan goes
even farther. The Framers saw the Indian Commerce Clause fundamentally
as a remedy for the uncertainty that had pervaded Indian affairs under prior
regimes - specifically, under the Articles of Confederation. In their view, the
clause established a clarity of doctrine in the field of Indian affairs that would
allow federal Indian policy to move forward unimpeded. By again clouding
issues of state authority over Indian affairs, the modern Court has dismantled
the Framers' design. And today, as it did in the preconstitutional era, that
uncertainty is frustrating federal Indian policy.
This comment chronicles and analyzes the Supreme Court's return to
uncertainty in the area of commerce between Indians and non-Indians. The
first step, undertaken in part II, is to discern precisely what the Framers
intended when they added the words "and with the Indian Tribes" to the
Constitution. Part III examines and analyzes the Supreme Court's treatment
of the Indian Commerce Clause from the Worcester era through the modern
era, laying bare the doubt and confusion created by the Court's modern
approach and considering the ramifications of current doctrine. Finally, part
IV examines the relevance of the Framers' intent in the twilight of the
twentieth century, and discusses the prospect of judicial enforcement of an
originalist conception of the Indian Commerce Clause in the modern era.
II. The Intent of the Framers: A Plenary and Exclusive
Power over Indian Commerce
The history of the development of the Indian Commerce Clause
demonstrates that its Framers intended the clause to remedy the jurisdictional
uncertainty that had pervaded Indian affairs under the Articles of
Confederation and even under British colonial government. Specifically, the
authors of the Constitution conceived of Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 as an
exclusive commitment to the federal government of control over commerce
between Indians and non-Indians.' " No longer was the uncertain reach of
state authority over commerce with the Indians to impede federal Indian
policy.
Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989) (affirming application of state taxes to
non-Indian mineral lessee of tribal lands despite detailed federal regulation of tribal mineral
leasing).
9. The Court's failure to adhere to the original understanding of the Indian Commerce Clause
has been noted in academic literature. See. e.g., Robert N. Clinton, State Power Over Indian
Reservations: A Critical Comment on Burger Court Doctrine, 26 S.D. L. R v. 434 (1981).




By federalizing relations between Indians and non-Indians, the participants
in the Constitutional Convention of 1787 accomplished what for many of
them had been an elusive goal for almost four decades. Indian policy was a
critical issue in colonial America, where the day-to-day governance of Indian
affairs was largely left to the colonies. The colonies sought early on to
regulate sales of guns and liquor to the Indians; and purchases of furs from
the Indians played a large part in the colonial economy." Thus, the colonies
attempted - most often unsuccessfully - to assert control over the widely
dispersed Indian trade in the form of licensing systems for those engaging in
it. 2 The colonial efforts failed to halt problems of corruption, fraud, and
steady encroachment by non-Indians on Indian lands. 3 As a result, Indian
hostility toward the colonists grew to the point that in 1754 a Mohawk leader
threatened to sever the traditional ties between the Six Nations of the Iroquois
and the colony of New York. 4 Desperate to retain the loyalty of the Indians
during the contest with France for European dominance of the North
American continent, seven of the thirteen colonies, in June 1754, sent
representatives, including Benjamin Franklin, to Albany, New York, to
address problems of colonial Indian relations.
This gathering, which became known as the Albany Congress, provided
Franklin and the other delegates with their first opportunity to lift commerce
with the Indians out of the hands of the individual colonies. The delegates
first succeeded in renewing the Indian alliance," then Franklin guided the
Congress toward a grander scheme - the first plan of colonial union."7 The
plan created at the Albany Congress proposed organizing the colonies under
a President General and Grand Council.'" To remedy problems caused by
numerous, inconsistent agreements made by the various colonies with the
Indians, the plan gave a political and commercial monopoly on Indian affairs
to the President General and Grand Council. It granted them the powers to
"hold or direct all Indian Treaties in which the General Interest or Welfare of
the Colonies may be concerned, & to make Peace or declare War with Indian
Nations," to "make such Laws as they judge necessary for regulating all
Indian Trade," and to "make all purchases from Indians for the Colonies."
11. See FRANCIS P. PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMATIVE YEARS 6-8
(1962).
12. See generally id. at 5-11.
13. Id. at 9-11.
14. ROBERT C. NEWBOLD, THE ALBANY CONGRESS AND PLAN OF UNION OF 1754, at 22
(1955). The Six Nations were the Mohawks, the Oneidas, the Onondagas, the Tuscaroras, the
Cayugas, and the Senecas. Id. at 20.
15. Id. at 22-37.
16. Id. at 49-71.
17. Id. at 90-119.
18. Id. at 184.
19. Id. at 186. In discussing the Albany Plan's Indian provisions, Newbold notes that
No. 2]
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Despite its promise, the Albany Plan, as it came to be known, was greeted
with ambivalence by provincial legislatures jealous of their governmental
prerogatives. They either rejected it, delayed consideration of it, or ignored
it.!' The final blow came when the plan was entirely ignored by the British
King.2 ' Nonetheless, the Albany Plan established the first recognition by
colonial leaders that Indian relations in America could not properly be
managed if Indian policy were, splintered among the numerous colonies.
Though the Albany Plan failed, its theme of centralization of power over
Indian affairs was soon taken up by the English government. The Crown in
1755 appointed Indian superintendents to take full authority over political
relations between the Indians and the British.' Then, in his Proclamation of
1763, King George I moved to halt colonial encroachment on Indian land
by establishing, for the first time, a boundary line between Indian and non-
Indian lands.' The most comprehensive initiative came in 1764, when the
British Board of Trade proposed a plan to regulate commercial and political
Indian affairs under the Crown "so as to sett [sic] aside all local interfering
of particular Provinces, which has been one great cause of the distracted state
of Indian affairs in general."' While the plan never was adopted and finally
was abandoned in 1768, it set the stage for later initiatives of the united
colonies.
'the colonies were soon in open rebellion against the British, and Indian
affairs suddenly assumed a new importance. Hostility between the
encroaching colonists and the Indians had continued to foment until the
Revolution? The British sought to exploit the animosity of many tribes
toward the colonists in the hope of enlisting the aid of the Indians in the
revolutionary conflict.' The Continental Congress answered the British
initiative with its first formal Indian policy, based on a report by its
"[h]aving witnessed the great harm done to Indian relations by many separate agreements
negotiated by individual governments, the commissioners felt that the handling of all important
Indian treaties by the union would better serve the common good." Id. at 127.
20. The dismal legislative record of the Albany Plan in the colonies is recounted by
Newbold. Id. at 135-77.
21. Id. at 172-78.
22. PRUCHA, supra note 11, at 11-13; see aLso NEVBOLD, supra note 14, at 71.
23. PRUCHA, supra note I1, at 13-20.
24. Id. at 21-22. The plan would have repealed all colonial laws governing Indian affairs and
placed control over such affairs in the hands of superintendents appointed by the Crown. Id. at
22.
25. Notably, many Indian tribes sided with the French during the war between England and
France that erupted in 1754. PRUCHA, supra note 11, at 11.
26. Id. at 26-27. The Continental Congress's Committee on Indian Affairs reported in July
1775 that "there is too much reason to apprehend that [the English] Administration will spare no
pains -to excite the several Nations of Indians to take up arms against these colonies," 2




Committee on Indian Affairs, on July 12, 1775. Aimed at "securing and
preserving the friendship of the Indian Nations,"'27 the policy called for
establishing three Indian departments, one for the northern tribes (which
included the Six Nations), one for the southern tribes such as the Cherokee,
and a middle department for those in between2 Each department would be
headed by commissioners who would have the power "to treat with the
Indians in their respective departments, in the name, and on behalf of the
united colonies, in order to preserve peace and friendship ... and to prevent
their taking part in the present commotions."'
Only nine days later, Franklin presented the Continental Congress with a
first draft of the Articles of Confederation that went even farther toward
centralizing Indian policy in the Congress. Franklin's draft echoed his Albany
Plan by providing that "[n]o Colony shall engage in an offensive War with
any Nation of Indians without the Consent of the Congress," calling for a
"perpetual Alliance offensive and defensive" with the Six Nations, barring
encroachments on Indian lands and purchases of such lands by the colonies,
and mandating that any land purchases from the Indians be made only by
Congress." A second draft by the Pennsylvanian John Dickinson augmented
the centralization of Indian affairs by repeating Franklin's proposed Indian
provisions and adding another: Among the powers of the United States under
Dickinson's Articles of Confederation was listed that of "Regulating the Trade,
and managing all Affairs with the Indians."'"
Franklin's and Dickinson's ideas were not uniformly welcomed. In a July
26, 1776, debate on Dickinson's draft, Edward Rutledge and Thomas Lynch
of South Carolina objected to giving Congress the power of managing Indian
affairs on the ground that trade with the Indians was too profitable to be
surrendered by the states.32 The South Carolina position was opposed by
George Walton of Georgia, who urged centralization of Indian affairs because
Georgia was "not equal to the expense of giving the donations to the Indians,
which will be necessary to keep them at peace."33 James Wilson of
Pennsylvania contributed perhaps the most insightful comment, arguing that
"[n]o lasting peace will be [made] with the Indians, unless made by some one
body." While Wilson's comments may have been prophetic, those of
27. Id.
28. Id. at 174-75; see also PRUCHA, supra note 11, at 27-28.
29. JOURNALS, supra note 26, at 175. The importance attached to this initiative by the
Continental Congress is illustrated by the fact that the commissioners selected for the middle
department were Benjamin Franklin, Patrick Henry, and James Wilson. Id. at 183.
30. Id. at 197-98.
31. 5 id. at 549-50 (1776).
32. 6 id. at 1077 (1776).
33. Id. at 1078.
34. Id. Wilson argued for nationalization of Indian affairs on the ground that a united front
by the colonies would impress the Indian tribes:
No. 21
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Virginian Carter Braxton proved more persuasive. Braxton urged that the
broad grant of federal authority over Indian trade and affairs should except
"such Indians as are tributary to any State,"" and on August 20, 1776, his
view prevailed. An amended draft of the Articles of Confederation presented
on that day omitted the provisions of Dickinson's draft barring colonies from
buying Indian land and calling for a perpetual alliance with the Six Nations.
In their place, it provided only that Congress would have the power of
"regulating the trade, and managing all affairs with the Indians, not members
of any of the States."'
Even that revision was not enough to satisfy the guardians of states' rights
in the Continental Congress. On October 28, 1777, an amendment further
limited the congressional Indian affairs power by adding to the language
already quoted in the proviso: "that the legislative right of any State, within
its own limits be not infringed or violated."" When the Continental Congress
finally approved the Articles of Confederation on November 15, 1777, Article
IX could proclaim only that
The United States, in Congress assembled, shall also have the sole
and exclusive right and power of . . .regulating the trade and
managing all affairs with the Indians not members of any of the
states; provided that the legislative right of any State within its
own limits be not infringed or violated.38
The only thing certain about Article IX was that it firmly established
uncertainty regarding the respective limits of state and federal authority over
Indian commerce.
The problem with the Article IX grant of power was twofold. As James
Madison explained in Federalist No. 42:
Indians know the striking benefits of confederation; they have an example of it in
the union of the Six Nations. The idea of the union of the Colonies struck them
forcibly last year. None should trade with Indians without a license from
Congress. A perpetual war would be unavoidable, if everybody was allowed to
trade with them.
Id. Wilson's comments, and the July 26 debate in general, also are discussed in MERRILL JENSEN,
THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 155 (1940).
35. 6 JOURNALS, supra note 26, at 1077 (1776).
36. 5 id. at 682.
37. 9 id. at 845 (1777). An earlier proposal would have stricken the entire Indian affairs
clause in favor of granting Congress the power of "managing all affairs relative to war and peace
with all Indians not members of any particular State, and regulating the trade with such nations
and tribes as are not resident within such limits wherein a particular State claims, and actually
exercises jurisdiction." Id. at 844. Consideration of this proposal was postponed and never
reumed.




What description of Indians are to be deemed members of a State,
is not yet settled; and has been a question of frequent perplexity
and contention in the Foederal [sic] Councils. And how the trade
with Indians, though not members of a State, yet residing within
its legislative jurisdiction, can be regulated by an external
authority, without so far intruding on the internal rights of
legislation, is absolutely incomprehensible.39
For his part, Madison read Article IX narrowly so as to mitigate the damage
it inflicted upon federal authority. He viewed its qualifying language as
nothing more than an effort "to save to the States their right of preemption of
lands from the Indians"' - preemption being the right to take Indian land
voluntarily ceded or abandoned, or won by conquest.4' Otherwise, Madison
warned, "[i]f this proviso be taken in its full latitude, it must destroy the
authority of Congress altogether, since no act of Congs. within the limits of
a State can be conceived which will not in some way or other encroach upon
the authority [of the] States." '42
Advocates of state power did not share Madison's construction of the new
article. The uncertainty built into Article IX allowed states to make claims of
broad authority over Indian affairs, leading to conflicts that plagued the new
confederation throughout its existence. The Continental Congress took early
note of this uncertainty. On May 1, 1782, a congressional committee reporting
on state land cessions noted competing claims to lands by Indian tribes and
land companies and warned that "many inconveniences will arise to the
citizens of these United States, unless the jurisdiction of the United States in
Congress assembled, with regard to Indian affairs, is more clearly defined and
established."'43
39. THE FEDERALIST No. 42, supra note 1, at 269; see also 2 JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1094 (1833) (echoing Madison's commentary).
40. Letter from James Madison to James Monroe (Nov. 27, 1784), in 8 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON 156 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1973) [hereinafter PAPERS OF MADISON].
Madison's reasons for his view were:
1. That this was the principal right formerly exerted by the Colonies with regard
to the Indians. 2. that it was a right asserted by the laws as well as the
proceedings of all of them, and therefore being most familiar, wd. be most likely
to be in contemplation of the Parties; 3. that being of most consequence to the
States individually, and least consistent with the general powers of Congress, it
was most likely to be made a ground of Compromise. 4. it has been always said
that the proviso came from the Virga. Delegates, who wd naturally be most
vigilant over the territorial rights of their Constituents.
Id. at 156-57.
41. Robert N. Clinton, Book Review, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 846, 855 (1980) (reviewing
RUSSEL L. BARSH & JAMES Y. HENDERSON, THE ROAD: INDIAN TRIBES & POLITICAL LIBERTY
(1980)).
42. Id. at 157.
43. 22 JOURNALS, supra note 26, at 230 (1782). The committee sought to clarify the
No. 2]
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After the Revolutionary War, Congress sought to exercise its dubious
authority over Indian affairs by reestablishing relations with the Indians, many
of whom had joined the British forces in opposition to the Americans. To that
end, Congress issued a proclamation on September 22, 1783, barring
encroachment on Indian lands outside the states, and voiding all prior
purchases of such lands.' Congress also sought to prevent future hostilities
with the Indians by setting the boundaries of non-Indian and Indian lands."
But uncertainty over state jurisdiction regarding these same matters soon
created difficulty. Commissioners from the State of New York in 1784
disrupted the federal negotiations with the Six Nations that led to the Treaty
of Fort Stanwix. The commissioners claimed exclusive power to make treaties
with the Indians.4 In another instance, representatives from North Carolina
in 1785 moved for Congress to disavow the Treaty of Hopewel 47 - by
which Congress defined the lands of the Cherokee Nation - to the extent the
treaty granted lands within that state to the Indians.4s
A jurisdictional dispute produced more serious problems in Georgia, where
state representatives, on November 3, 1786, signed the Treaty of
Shoulderbone with the Creek Indians in defiance of the federal claim to
exclusive power to deal with Indian tribes.49 The treaty, agreed to by a small
band of Creeks pretending to speak for their entire nation, gave the state all
Creek lands in Georgia east of the Oconee River." The larger body of the
Creeks, who claimed never to have agreed to this cession, responded to
subsequent non-Indian encroachments by threatening war on the Georgians."'
The Secretary of War, in reporting on this conflict to Congress in 1787,
recommended steps to prevent bloodshed but pointed directly to Article IX as
congressional jurisdiction by proposing a resolution that "the sole right of superintending,
protecting, treating with, and making purchases of the several Indian nations situate and being
without the bounds of any of the different states in the union, is necessarily vested in the United
States in Congress assembled." Id. at 230-31. It is significant that the committee felt compelled
to assert what Article IX had only just declared.
44. 25 JOURNALS, supra note 26, at 602 (1783).
45. PRUCHA, supra note 11, at 32-33.
46. See Letter from James Monroe to James Madison (Nov. 15, 1784), in PAPERS OP
MADISON, supra note 40, at 140 (discussing "variance" between the Indian commissioners of
United States and of New York); see also PRUCHA, supra note 11, at 34; RANDOLPH C. DOWNES,
COUNCIL FIRES ON THE UPPER OHIO 287-89 (1940).
47. This treaty was reprinted in 30 JOURNALS, supra note 26, at 187-90 (1786).
48. 28 JOURNALS, supra note 26, at 297 (1785); see also 32 id. at 237-38 (1787) (containing
instructions of North Carolina legislature to state delegates to seek disavowal of Treaty of
Hopewell; motion pursuant to instructions referred to committee).
49. PRUCHA, supra note 11, at 37.
50. Id.
51. 32 JOURNALS, supra note 26, at 366 (1787) (recording the Secretary of War's reports that
"the ill temper on this subject has risen to such an height, as to render it highly probable, that the
said Indians have commenced, or soon will commence hostilities on the frontiers of said State,




an obstacle making "an interference by the United States... attended with
peculiar embarrassments:" 2
The power given by the Confederation, to the United States "of
regulating the trade and managing all affairs with the indians not
members of any of the states, provided that the legislative right
of any states within its own limits be not infringed or violated" is
perhaps, too inexplicit to be applied as a remedy in the present
case. The Creeks are an independent tribe, and cannot with
propriety be said to be members of the State of Georgia, yet the
said State exercises legislative jurisdiction over the territory in
dispute. Therefore as the claims of lands are the great source of
difference and hostility between the Whites and Indians the before
recited power, appears to be entirely unavailing, according to state
constructions, in all cases within the jurisdiction of an individual
state.53
The Secretary concluded, in words echoing those of James Wilson eleven
years earlier, that "it is apparent from every representation that unless the
United States do in reality possess the power 'to manage all affairs with the
independent tribes of indians' to observe and enforce all treaties made by the
authority of the union that a general indian war may be expected."'
For its part, Georgia sought to obtain from Congress a resolution warning
the Creeks that any hostilities would be punished by United States forces.5
Instead, it received a report from the congressional Committee on Indian
Affairs recommending that Georgia, as well as North Carolina - which also
was involved in the dispute - should ward off hostilities by ceding territory
to the United States for use by the Indians.' The committee report
accompanying this recommendation concluded that "there is sufficient
evidence to shew [sic] that those tribes do not complain altogether without
cause," and that "[a]n avaricious disposition in some of our people to acquire
large tracts of land and often by unfair means, appears to be the principal
source of difficulties with the Indians."" While the committee acknowledged
that working out the title to such lands would be difficult, it deemed the
uncertainty over state authority created by Article IX to be "far more
embarrassing."" The committee thus asserted that
52. Id. at 366.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 368.
55. 33 JOURNALS, supra note 26, at 407-08 (1787).
56. Id. at 462.
57. Id. at 457.
58. Id.
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[t]he powers necessary to [manage Indian affairs] appear to the
committee to be indivisible, and that the parties to the
confederation must have intended to give them entire to the
Union, or to have given them entire to the State; these powers
before the revolution were possessed by the King, and exercised
by him nor did they interfere with the legislative right of the
colony within its limits ... .
The disputes between North Carolina, the Cherokee, Georgia, and the
Creeks raged through 1788 without resolution. By July 18 of that year the
Secretary of War could report to Congress that non-Indian residents of the
North Carolina frontier had "committed the most unprovoked and direct
outrages against the Cherokee Indians" as to amount to "an actual informal
war of the said white inhabitants against the said Cherokees."' Congress in
response could merely reassert its authority over Indian affairs - an authority
severely questioned by contemporary events - with a proclamation
forbidding encroachments and hostilities by the non-Indians.6 While the
proclamation likely was meaningless, given the lack of respect paid by the
states to prior such announcements, the lesson learned from the southern
Indian disputes was not. The problems that had arisen under Article IX in
New York, North Carolina, and Georgia were well-known to the Framers who
gathered in Philadelphia to draft a new national constitution in 1787.
James Madison, for one, came to the Constitutional Convention resolved
to eliminate the uncertainty surrounding the respective authority of the states
and the United States to manage commerce with the Indians. Commenting on
a plan of government proposed by William Paterson of New Jersey, Madison
asked, "Will it prevent encroachments on the federal authority?"'
Srecifically, Madison noted that "[b]y the federal articles, transactions with
the Indians appertain to Congs. Yet in several instances, the States have
entered into treaties & wars with them."' Madison sought to remedy this
59. Id. at 458-59. The committee also warned of the states' construction of Article IX:
The construction contended for by those States, if right, appears to the committee,
to leave the federal powers, in this case, a mere nullity; and to make it totally
uncertain on what principle Congress is to interfere between them and the said
tribes; The States not only contend for this construction, but have actually pursued
measures in conformity to it. North Carolina has undertaken to assign land to the
Cherokees, and Georgia has proceeded to treat with the Creeks concerning peace,
lands, and the objects, usually the principal ones in almost every treaty with the
Indians.
Id. at 457.
60. 34 JOURNALS, supra note 26, at 342 (1788).
61. Id. at 476-79.
62. JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 142
(Adrienne Koch ed., 1987).




problem on August 18 by submitting, among several proposed congressional
powers, the power "[t]o regulate affairs with the Indians as well within as
without the limits of the U. States."'64 This proposal was considered by the
Committee on Detail, which responded on August 22 by attempting to narrow
it. The committee supplemented a grant of congressional power "to regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States" with the words
"and with Indians, within the limits of any state, not subject to the laws
thereof."' This amendment must have looked dangerously like the language
of Article IX to Madison and others who favored centralization of the Indian
commerce power, though the records on the debates are silent on the point.
Whatever the reason, when the clause reappeared in the report of the
Committee of Eleven on September 4, the language tagged to the end of the
congressional commerce power was shortened to read only "and with the
Indian tribes."' The convention approved the clause on that same day
without comment.67
The convention's handling of Indian commerce amounted to only five
words, but their import was clear in light of the events leading up to the
Constitutional Convention. For four decades, first the colonies and the Crown,
and then the states and Congress, had competed for power over Indian affairs.
The need for central control of Indian affairs had been recognized by the
delegates to the Albany Congress, by the British Crown, and later by many
of the drafters of the Articles of Confederation. Experience under Article IX
further confirmed that need. The uncertain reach of state authority over Indian
relations had embarrassed the Continental Congress in New York and
threatened it with the need for military action in the South. In response,
Congress, faced with the ambiguity of Article IX, could only assert but not
enforce its preeminent power to deal with the Indians. As Madison discerned,
the only remedy for this uncertainty was a clear grant of exclusive federal
power in the new Constitution. Further proof of the Framers' intent is
supplied by their specific deletion of a proviso tagged on to the end of the
Indian Commerce Clause that would have preserved state power over Indian
affairs within state borders.' Thus, the conclusion seems inescapable that the
Framers intended the Indian Commerce Clause to remove all doubt about the
location of authority over Indian commerce: The states were excluded.
Madison could proclaim in the wake of the convention that the federal
regulation of "commerce with the Indian tribes is very properly unfettered
1830 and 1836, again included among the defects of the Articles of Confederation that "[iln
certain cases the authy. of the Confederacy was disregarded," noting that "the Fedl. Authy. was
violated by Treaties & wars with Indians, as by Geo." Id. at 1, 14.
64. Id. at 477.
65. Id. at 509.
66. Id. at 574.
67. Id. at 575.
68. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
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from two limitations in the Articles of Confederation, which render the
provision obscure and contradictory."'
More limited constructions of the clause are, of course, possible. One such
view is that the Indian Commerce Clause was intended merely to make plain
the plenary power of the federal government over Indian affairs, not
necessarily to exclude the states from that power where the federal
government was silent. This view, while it accords with the most recent
stance taken on the question by the Supreme Court," is correct but
incomplete. The Framers surely did intend the Indian Commerce Clause to
make clear the federal power to regulate relations with the Indians. However,
events leading up to the drafting of the clause demonstrate that such federal
power could be assured in only one way - by making it exclusive.
Otherwise, inconsistencies between the positions taken by the states and the
federal government would disrupt federal Indian relations under the new
Constitution as they had in Georgia and North Carolina under the Articles of
Confederation."' The correct and complete view was stated skillfully by
Justice Story, who, reflecting on the Indian Commerce Clause in 1833,
concluded that it gave "to congress, as the only safe and proper depositary,
the exclusive power, which belonged to the crown in the ante-revolutionary
times; a power indispensable to the peace of the states, and the just
preservation of the rights and territory of the Indians. '
Despite Justice Story's certainty,' however, the confusion over the reach
of state power that had frustrated American commerce with the Indians before
ratification of the Constitution was only temporarily vanquished. It was to re-
emerge long after the deaths of Madison and the other Framers, imported back
into federal Indian law by Justice Story's successors on the Supreme Court.
69. THE FEDERALIST No. 42, supra note 1, at 268.
70. See Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989) (stating that "the
central function of the Indian Commerce Clause is to provide Congress with plenary power to
legislate in the field of Indian affairs").
71. An additional problem posed by the view that the Indian Commerce Clause allows states
to exert authority over Indian commerce where the federal government is silent is that it relegates
the Indian Commerce Clause to a role already amply filled by the Supremacy Clause. The
Supremacy Clause, after all, precludes inconsistent state regulation where Congress has spoken.
See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). See generally
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW § 6-25 (2d ed. 1988).
72. STORY, supra note 39, at § 1094.
73. It is notable that both Story and the Continental Congress, see supra note 59 and
accompanying text, referred to the exclusive power over Indian affairs held by the English
government prior to the Revolution. It may be presumed that these references are to the Crown's
initiatives between 1763 and 1768, see supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text, but in fact
control over the Indian trade fell back upon the colonies after the British Plan of 1764 was
abandoned in 1768. See PRUCHA, supra note I1, at 23-25. The federal government's exclusive
power over Indian commerce is thus more properly traced to the Framers' intent to remedy the




III. Supreme Court Jurisprudence: Undoing the Framers' Intent
The Supreme Court has disregarded the direction of the Framers in the
broadest sense by making the reach of state authority over relations between
Indians and non-Indians once again uncertain. But what is more, it has done
so - mostly in the modern era - without ever officially acknowledging the
constitutional history it ignores. The Court's treatment of the Framers'
accomplishment in Indian affairs is marked by three milestones of
jurisprudence. Two of them, Worcester v. Georgia74 and United States v.
McBratney,5 come readily to the minds of most Indian law attorneys and
scholars. They represent the paradigms of two competing approaches to
federal Indian law, the former conceiving of tribes as independent sovereigns,
the latter conceiving of them as irrelevant anachronisms.7 The third,
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation,' is
less obvious, but no less momentous to the development of Indian Commerce
Clause doctrine, particularly in light of documents now available detailing the
Court's approach to that and subsequent cases. The movement of Indian
Commerce Clause jurisprudence past these milestones represents the slow
unraveling of the Framers' design.
The Court reached the first milestone, Worcester, with a resounding
affirmation of the Framers' intent. In 1829 and 1830, gold was discovered on
Indian land in Georgia. The State of Georgia sought to end its long struggle
against the Cherokee Nation by delivering a coup de, grace: Georgia
obliterated the political identity of the Cherokee by enacting two state laws
that extinguished the Cherokee tribal government, distributed Cherokee
territory to several Georgia counties, and extended Georgia state law over the
former Cherokee lands." When a Georgia state court sentenced Samuel
Worcester, a white missionary living on Cherokee lands, to four years in
prison at hard labor for violating a state law prohibiting whites from living in
the Cherokee territory without a state license, the Supreme Court heard
Worcester's appeal." In an opinion the Court itself has described as one of
74. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
75. 104 U.S. 621 (1882).
76. See FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 259, 264 (Rennard
Strickland et al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter COHEN] (discussing Worcester and McBratney at length
in chapter titled, "The Source and Scope of State Authority in Indian Affairs"); see also CHARLES
F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW 23-31 (1987) (characterizing Worcester
and McBramney as competing "classic formulations" of Indian law).
77. 447 U.S. 134 (1979).
78. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 521-28; see also Joseph C. Burke, The Cherokee Cases:
A Study in Law, Politics, and Morality, 21 STAN. L. REv. 500 (1969) (discussing circumstances
surrounding Court's decision in Worcester).
79. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 537-41.
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its most "courageous and eloquent,"' Chief Justice John Marshall invalidated
the Georgia statutes because they violated the laws, treaties, and Constitution
of the United States. As a constitutional basis for his holding, Marshall
clearly relied on the Indian Commerce Clause, stating that "[t]he whole
intercourse between the United States and [the Cherokee] nation is, by our
Constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United States."'"
Thus, Marshall concluded:
[T]he acts of Georgia are repugnant to the Constitution, laws, and
treaties of the United States. They interfere forcibly with the
relations established between the United States and the Cherokee
Nation, the regulation of which, according to the settled principles
of our Constitution, are committed exclusively to the government
of the Union.'
Despite its eloquent tone and moral force, Chief Justice Marshall's view of
the Worcester case was not unanimous. In a notable concurrence, Justice
McLean sounded a theme that was to gain force in Indian law jurisprudence
in the coming years. "The exercise of the power of self-government by the
Indians within a state," McLean wrote, "is undoubtedly contemplated to be
temporary."" He went on to reason that,
If a tribe of Indians shall become so degraded or reduced in
numbers as to lose the power of self-government, the protection
of the local law, of necessity, must be extended over them. The
point at which this exercise of power by a State would be proper,
need not now be considered, if, indeed, it be a judicial question."
That such matters were judicial questions in Justice McLean's view was
borne out three years after Worcester when McLean decided United States v.
Cisna" while riding circuit in Ohio. In Cisna, McLean held that assimilation
into non-Indian society of Indians on the Wyandott Reservation in Ohio
rendered the exercise of Congress's Indian Commerce Clause power "wholly
impracticable"; thus, a non-Indian could be prosecuted by the state for stealing
a horse from a Wyandott Indian on the reservation." Although in 1866 the
Supreme Court, in The Kansas Indians,"7 rejected Justice McLean's theory
80. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219 (1959).
81. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561. In his thorough discussion of Indian law in
Worcester, Chief Justice Marshall specifically recounted the event, surrounding the framing of
the Indian Commerce Clause, concluding that the powers it granted to Congress "comprehend all
that is required for the regulation of our intercourse with the Indians." Id. at 559.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 593.
84. Id.
85. 25 F. Cas. 422 (C.C.D. Ohio 1835).
86. Id. at 424-26.




that the assimilation of Indians into non-Indian society could somehow
dissipate the force of the Indian Commerce Clause, McLean's view that
federal Indian law must adapt to changed circumstances proved influential in
later Supreme Court jurisprudence on Indian commerce questions.
In the wake of Worcester, however, the Court stood fast by Chief Justice
Marshall's position in a series of cases striking down state taxation of Indian
propertyY As late as 1876, in United States v. 43 Gallons of Whiskey,' the
Court harkened back to Worcester in recounting the difficulties posed by
Article IX's limitations on the federal Indian commerce power and the
subsequent removal of those limitations, concluding that "Congress now has
the exclusive and unfettered power to regulate commerce with the Indian
Tribes - a power as broad and as free from restrictions as that to regulate
commerce with foreign nations."''
In 1881, the Court modified this view at the second milestone. In United
States v. McBratney, the Court affirmed the power of the State of Colorado
to try a white man for the murder of a white man within the Ute Indian
Reservation." The decision was the first by the Court allowing state law to
operate on an Indian Reservation, and it marked a withdrawal from the
conceptual clarity of Chief Justice Marshall's Worcester opinion. Its
inconsistency with Worcester also created the first uncertainty in Indian
commerce doctrine since Article IX was replaced by the Indian Commerce
Clause. If a non-Indian who violated the laws of Georgia in the Cherokee
Territory was outside the reach of state law, how could a non-Indian who
violated the laws of Colorado on the Ute Reservation be subject to state
prosecution? The Court failed to provide any answers in McBratney itself, a
murky opinion in which Justice Gray, writing for the majority, apparently
found that the Colorado Enabling Act repealed all prior statutes inconsistent
with itself, including those providing for federal court jurisdiction over major
crimes on Indian reservations." Significantly, however, the Court cited to
were in a situation similar to that of the Wyandotts in Cisna - "pressed upon" by a white
population, their territory subject to "a mixed occupancy ... by the red and white men." Id. at
754-55. The Court, however, found this situation irrelevant, stating that while "[i]t may be that
they [the Shawnees] cannot exist much longer as a distinct people in the presence of the
civilization of Kansas," they nevertheless were immune to a Kansas tax on their property as long
as they retained their tribal organization. Id. at 756. The Court also reaffirmed the Indian
Commerce Clause as an independent bar to state authority in its characterization of the Shawnees
as "a people distinct from others, capable of making treaties, separated from the jurisdiction of
Kansas, and to be governed exclusively by the government of the Union." Id. at 755 (internal
quotations omitted) (emphasis added).
88. See id.; The New York Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 761 (1867).
89. 93 U.S. 188 (1876) (affirming application of federal law to bar introduction of liquor to
areas near Indian country).
90. Id. at 194 (emphasis added).
91. United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 624 (1882).
92. Id. at 623-24. Because the Court's holding also relied on the "equal footing doctrine" -
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Cisna as support for its holding, suggesting that Justice McLean's views based
on changed circumstances had proven influential.' Whatever the Court's
motivation, McBratney represented a major victory for states which for years
had sought to assert their authority over Indians and Indian lands.
With McBratney in their arsenals, states in the late nineteenth century and
early twentieth century began an effort to expand their authority over activity
on Indian reservations. In a series-of opinions that were neither extensively
reasoned nor clear in their doctrinal underpinnings, the Court first upheld
exercises of territorial taxing power on Indian reservations where no Indians
or Indian interests were involved. 5 The Court soon treated state taxes
identically.' However, where Indian interests were directly implicated, the
Court held state law inapplicable.' These cases established what amounted
the concept that new states are admitted to the Union with the same rights as the original states
- McBratney also has been described as "based on statutory construction influenced by
constitutional doubts." COHEN, supra note 76, at 265 n.46. In essence, the constitutional point
is that if the equal footing doctrine precludes federal jurisdiction in new states, federal jurisdiction
must have been lacking in the original states as a matter of constitutional law. Id. That
McBratney embodies a constitutional element also is suggested by the Court's subsequent
characterization of the case as "stand[ing] for the proposition that States, by virtue of their
statehood, have jurisdiction over [crimes between whites and whites which do not affect Indians]
notwithstanding [federal law granting federal jurisdiction over such crimes]." New York ex rel.
Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496, 500 (1946). In fact, any constitutional aspect of McBratney itself
can be limited by the fact that the Colorado Enabling Act lacked any clause excepting Indian
reservations from the state domain, in contrast to similar acts for other states. See McBratney, 104
U.S. at 623-24. However, this limitation evaporates in light of the Court's decision 14 years later
in Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240 (1896). In Draper, the Court reached the same result
as McBratney with regard to Montana, a state whose enabling act provided that "Indian lands
shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United States."
Id. at 244. These points notwithstanding, there is nothing manifestly constitutional about
McBraney, though the opinion without question altered the previous constitutional understanding
that the Indian Commerce Clause of its own force nullified state law on Indian reservations.
93. Id. at 624.
94. See NATL Ass'N OF ATrORNEYS GEN., LEGAL ISSUES IN INDIAN JURISDIcTION 9 (1976)
(noting state opposition to Worcester approach and characterizing McBratney as a victory for
states' position). The McBratney holding was affirmed in Draper, 164 U.S. at 240, and again in
Martin, 326 U.S. at 496.
95. In Utah & N. Ry. v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28 (1885), the Court upheld a territorial tax on a
railroad right-of-way across the Fort Hall Indian Reservation where Congress had withdrawn the
right-of-way from the reservation. The case suggested that an identical state tax would also be
val'd. See also Maricopa & P.R. Co. v. Arizona, 156 U.S. 347 (1895) (applying Fisher holding
to affirm territorial tax on railway across Gila River Reservation); Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264
(1898) (holding territorial tax on cattle grazed by whites on reservation to be valid because the
tax was too remote and indirect to be deemed a tax upon lands or privileges of Indians).
96. See, e.g., Montana Catholic Missions v. Missoula County, 200 U.S. 118 (1905)
(affirming Montana tax on cattle run by Jesuit priests on Flathead Indian Reservation).
97. See, e.g., Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243 (1913) (holding offenses committed
by or against Indians not governed by McBratney; federal courts have jurisdiction over crimes




to the rules of decision in cases involving state power over Indian reservations
as the modem era opened. Although the holdings of these cases were
fundamentally inconsistent with the holding of Worcester, which barred
absolutely any exercise of state power over Indian reservations, the analytical
framework they established could be viewed as consistent with Worcester in
a broad sense: Where Indian interests were involved, as they were in
Worcester, the Indian Commerce Clause, along with any applicable treaties
or statutes, blocked state exertions of regulatory power. Where no Indians or
Indian interests were involved, the constitutional concerns that animated
Worcester were not implicated and state regulation was valid.98 But even this
analytical framework was soon to break down.
The warning signs began with a series of cases in which the Court
distanced itself from the clarity of Worcester's approach through a number of
statements suggesting that Justice McLean's view was prevailing over Chief
Justice Marshall's. Beginning in 1959 with an admission that the Court had
"modified" the principles of Worcester," the erosion of Chief Justice
Marshall's rubric picked up speed in 1962 with an observation by Justice
Frankfurter that the "general notion" of an Indian reservation as an island free
from state law "has yielded to closer analysis when confronted, in the course
of subsequent developments, with diverse concrete situations.""lco Finally, the
Court in McClanahan v. State Tax Commission of Arizona",' acknowledged
that "the doctrine [of Worcester] has undergone considerable evolution in
response to changed circumstances."'" Even so, the Court during this period
invalidated most state attempts to regulate activities on Indian reservations."3
In doing so, however, the Court avoided reliance on the absolute bar of the
Indian Commerce Clause, and instead relied on a case-by-case preemption
analysis under the Supremacy Clause." By 1973, even the Court recognized
98. See Clinton, supra note 9, at 437-38. Professor Clinton reconciles McBratney and its
progeny with Worcester by asserting that "[t]hese cases could be readily explained as falling
outside of the negative implications of exclusively committing commerce with the Indian tribes
to Congress since they involve no social, political or economic intercourse with the Indian tribes
or their members." Id.
99. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219 (1959).
100. Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 72 (1962).
101. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
102. Id. at 171.
103. Compare Williams, 358 U.S. at 217 (holding state court to have no jurisdiction over
an action by non-Indian reservation store owner to collect debt from an Indian customer) and
Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965) (holding Arizona
sales tax inapplicable to trader on Navajo Indian Reservation) with Organized Village of Kake,
369 U.S. at 571 (holding Alaskan Indians' exercise of off-reservation fishing rights to be subject
to state fishing laws).
104. See, e.g., McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 172 ("Mhe trend has been away from the idea of
inherent Indian sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdiction and toward reliance on federal pre-
emption.").
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the uncertainty generated by this approach, noting that generalizations about
the reach of state authority over Indian reservations had "become particularly
treacherous" as the "conceptual clarity" of Worcester "[gave] way to more
individualized treatment of particular treaties and specific federal statutes..
• .,'0 Even so, a change in Court personnel, a shift in doctrine, or perhaps
merely a close examination of the Framers' intent could have breathed life
once again into the Indian Commerce Clause as a significant bar to assertions
of state power on Indian reservations; no irreparable damage had been done.
That began to change in 1976 with Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai
Tribes," in which the Court, in the course of invalidating state property and
sales taxes as applied to on-reservation Indians, stated that "the basis for the
invalidity of these taxing measures.., is the Supremacy Clause, and not any
automatic exemptions 'as a matter of constitutional law' . . . under the
Commerce Clause...., 0 7 But the real damage was done four years later
when the Court reached its third milestone of Indian commerce jurisprudence,
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation.'3
Building on a portion of the Moe opinion affirming the validity of a Montana
state tax applied to sales of cigarettes to non-Indians by an Indian smokeshop,
the Court in Colville upheld a similar Washington tax, as well as a state sales
tax. The Court so held despite the facts that the tribes in the case imposed
their own tax on the cigarettes, and that application of the state taxes would
put tribal sales at a competitive disadvantage with non-Indian cigarette
sellers."°' In so holding, Justice White, writing for the majority, rejected an
argument that the tax was invalidated by the "negative implications" of the
Indian Commerce Clause:
It can no longer be seriously argued that the Indian Commerce
Clause, of its own force, automatically bars all state taxation of
matters significantly touching the political and economic interests
of the Tribes. That Clause may have a more limited role to play
in preventing undue discrimination against, or burdens on, Indian
commerce."'
0
With the constitutional argument removed from play, the Court resolved the
case by weighing the limited tribal interest - weakened, the Court found, by
the fact that tribal revenues in the case were derived not from value generated
on the reservation but, rather, from the marketing of an asserted tax
105. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973).
106. 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
107. ld. at 481 n.17.
108. 447 U.S. 134 (1979).
109. Id. at 158-59.




exemption - against what the Court found to be a strong state interest in
raising revenue by taxing off-reservation value."'
Colville's explicit rejection of the Indian Commerce Clause as a significant
factor in cases involving disputes over state power on Indian reservations
makes it a pivotal decision, but it is all the more pivotal in light of the fact
that the justices originally decided the case in favor of the tribes. The case
emerged from the justices' conference in October 1979, with a majority for
invalidation of the state cigarette and sales taxes as applied to tribal
smokeshops; the opinion for the court was assigned to Justice Brennan."'
Justice Brennan's first and second drafts of the opinion, circulated around the
Court during the next two months, analyzed the case in much the same
manner as his eventual dissent, holding the state taxes invalid because they
would penalize the tribe for imposing its own taxes. This conflicted with the
federal policy of encouraging tribal economic development."' Regarding the
Indian Commerce Clause, Brennan said that "rarely does the talismanic
invocation of constitutional language or rigid conceptions of state and tribal
sovereignty shed light on difficult problems" of state power on
reservations." 4 While hardly the rebirth of a Worcester-style analysis,
Brennan's draft essentially left the Indian Commerce Clause in the neglected-
but-not-eviscerated position it had assumed after Moe. But by February 1980,
only Justice Thurgood Marshall had signed on to Brennan's opinion on the
cigarette and sales tax issues."5 Four partial or total dissents were
circulating, one each from Justices Stevens, Rehnquist, Stewart, and White.
Forced to concede that his positions "have not carried the day," Brennan, on
February 4, 1980, asked Chief Justice Burger to reassign the majority
opinion."6 Burger assigned the case to White, and White's dismissal of the
Indian Commerce Clause as a bar to state taxation now appears in the United
States Reports.
The Court's reasoning in Colville becomes somewhat clearer in light of the
positions taken by two of the justices during the drafting of the opinion. Prior
to reassignment of the majority opinion, Justices White and Rehnquist
111. Id. at 156-57.
112. Memorandum from Chief Justice Warren Burger to Justice William Brennan (Oct. 15,
1979) (on file in Thurgood Marshall Collection, Library of Congress Manuscript Library,
Washington, D.C.).
113. See Justice William Brennan, Second Draft Majority Opinion, Washington v.
Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation 18-23 (Dec. 18, 1979) (on file in
Thurgood Marshall Collection, Library of Congress Manuscript Library, Washington, D.C.).
114. Id. at 16.
115. Memorandum from Justice Thurgood Marshall to Justice William Brennan (Dec. 13,
1979) (on file in Thurgood Marshall Collection, Library of Congress Manuscript Library,
Washington, D.C.).
116. Memorandum from Justice William Brennan to Chief Justice Warren Burger (Feb. 4,
1980) (on file in Thurgood Marshall Collection, Library of Congress Manuscript Library,
Washington, D.C.).
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circulated documents suggesting that they conceived of the Indian Commerce
Clause in a manner exactly opposite to that suggested by the events
surrounding the clause's framing. Rather than viewing the clause as an
independent bar to state regulation that operates in the absence of
congressional action, these justices believed the clause was without effect until
Congress acted. Thus, Justice White, in a concurrence and dissent to Justice
Brennan's opinion circulated on January 21, 1980, concluded that "[u]ntil and
unless Congress clearly construes and applies the Indian Commerce Clause
to bar state taxes on reservation sales to non-Indians, I would sustain state
revenue measures such as the cigarette and sales taxes involved here."' 7
Justice Rehnquist simply stated in a memorandum to Justice Brennan, "I, for
one, am simply unwilling to see this Court step in as a surrogate for Congress
unless the state taxation is discriminatory or subjects tribes to undue
interference with tribal self-government - neither of which are present in this
case.'... These views certainly minimize the role of the Indian Commerce
Clause in a way contrary to that envisioned by the Framers. More remarkable,
however, is that Justice White's view suggests at the least that it is not for the
Court but for Congress to fill out the meaning of the Indian Commerce Clause
- an approach that runs directly counter to the fundamental notion stated in
Marbury v. Madison that "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is.." 9
117. Justice Byron White, First Draft, Concurrence in Part and Dissent in Part, Washington
v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation (Jan. 21, 1980) (on file in Thurgood
Marshall Collection, Library of Congress Manuscript Library, Washington, D.C.).
118. Memorandum from Justice William Rehnquist to Justice William Brennan (Jan. 15,
1980) (on file in Thurgood Marshall Collection, Library of Congress Manuscript Library,
Washington, D.C.). Rehnquistfs views manifested themselves in his partial concurrence and
dissent in Colville, where he stated that "Indian immunities are dependent upon congressional
intent, at least absent discriminatory state action prohibited by the Indian Commerce Clause."
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 177 (1979)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Brennan countered Justice
Rehnquist's views with pragmatism:
However much we would like some clarification from Congress in this area, we
have received none in recent years. I find the suggestion that until we do we
should resolve doubtful cases against the Indians extraordinary. Rather, I think,
we must attempt to fill in the interstices in existing laws and treaties as best we
can. That process inevitably involves appropriate reference to broad federal
policies and notions of Indian sovereignty, however amorphous. I do not read
McClanahan, Mescalero and Moe to seal off evolution of the sovereignty doctrine
at some arbitrary point in the past or to deprive it of any effect in new situations.
Accordingly, I do not intend to alter my position on the cigarette tax.
Memorandum from Justice William Brennan to the Conference (Jan. 14, 1980) (on file in
Thurgood Marshall Collection, Library of Congress Manuscript Library, Washington, D.C.).
119. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Crnch) 137, 177 (1803). Not only does Justice White's
view vary from the rule set down by Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury, but it also takes the
erroneous position discussed previously, see supra note 71, that renders the Indian Commerce
Clause superfluous in light of the Supremacy Clause. That is, if Congress had barred state taxes
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol19/iss2/5
COMMENTS
Perhaps most remarkable is that instead of presaging a wholesale extension
of state law to Indian reservations, Colville was the precursor to a series of
cases in which state assertions of authority over non-Indians on Indian
reservations were for the most part invalidated. The trend began with White
Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker," where the balancing approach
employed by Justice White in Colville first blossomed in Justice Marshall's
hand into the "particularized inquiry" test that now sets the standard in this
area of federal Indian law. The case arose when Arizona sought to levy its
gross receipts and use fuel taxes on a logging corporation that contracted with
the White Mountain Apache Tribe to harvest reservation timber. 2' In
considering the tribe's challenge to the taxes, the Court identified two potential
barriers to assertions of state regulatory power over reservations and Indians:
First, such state regulations may be preempted by federal law, and, second,
they may infringe on tribal sovereignty.'" In assessing the preemption of
state laws that seek to regulate non-Indians engaging in on-reservation
activities, the Court called for "a particularized inquiry into the nature of the
state, federal, and tribal interests at stake, an inquiry designed to determine
whether, in the specific context, the exercise of state authority would violate
federal law."'" Applying the particularized inquiry test in Bracker, the Court
found the state taxes preempted by the comprehensive federal regulation of
timber harvesting on the reservation, especially in light of the state's failure
to supply any services justifying its tax.
on reservation sales to non-Indians, the Supremacy Clause would render such taxes invalid; the
Indian Commerce Clause would not be required.
120. 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
121. Id. at 138-41.
122. Id. at 142-43.
123. Id. at 145.
124. Id. at 151. In discussing the doctrinal framework that applied to the case, Justice
Marshall commented on the Indian Commerce Clause only to say that "automatic exemptions
[from state law] as a matter of constitutional law are unusual." Id. at 144 (internal quotations
omitted). But Justice Marshall was required to stave off an attack by Justice White on even this
weak language. In a March 27, 1980, memorandum to Justice Marshall, Justice White took
exception to the language quoted above, stating that "[a]t least the clear implication in Moe was
that automatic exemptions of this type are not recognized at all." Memorandum from Justice
Byron White to Justice Thurgood Marshall (Mar. 27, 1980) (on file in the Thurgood Marshall
Collection, Library of Congress Manuscript Library, Washington, D.C.). Marshall responded:
I do not agree that the statement.., in Moe - referring to automatic exemptions
as a matter of constitutional law - should be read as broadly as you suggest.
Certainly the language of the footnote does not extend that far. Moreover, a
number of our cases recognize the principle that the exercise of state authority
over the reservation may be impermissible, not because it is "preempted" in the
ordinary sense, but because it infringes on tribal self-government.... This princi-
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Bracker provided the impetus for a string of cases invalidating state laws
under the particularized inquiry test. In three cases involving state taxation of
Indian commerce - Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona State Tax
Commission," Ramah Navajo School Board v. New Mexico Bureau of
Revenue,"z and Montana v. Crow Tribe'7 - the Court held state taxes
invalid as applied to a non-Indian equipment dealer who sold eleven tractors
to the Gila River Indian Tribe," to a construction firm that contracted to
build a tribal school for the Navajos, 29 and to coal production on the lands
of the Crows.'30 Outside the tax context, the Court in New Mexico v.
Mescalero Apache Tribe blocked New Mexico from applying its hunting
regulations on the reservation of the Mescalero Apaches,' and in California
v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians prevented California from applying its
gambling regulations to reservation bingo games operated by the Cabazon
Band.' By contrast, the Court in Rice v. Rehner allowed California to
impose its liquor license requirement on a federally licensed Indian trader who
sold liquor on the Pala Reservation,' and, most recently, in Cotton
Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, allowed New Mexico to apply its oil and gas
production taxes to lessees of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe."
While the Indians won the majority of these cases, the battle for certainty
in this area of federal Indian law was lost. No longer can it be said that state
laws directly impacting Indians or Indian interests are invalid. Instead, the
Court, employing its particularized inquiry test, examines each state law in
light of federal and tribal interests. Several of the justices themselves have
pie, I think, is difficult to reconcile with the view that "automatic" or "consti-
tutional" exemptions are not recognized at all.
Memorandum from Justice Thurgood Marshall to Justice Byron White (Mar. 28, 1980) (on file
in Thurgood Marshall Collection, Library of Congress Manuscript Library, Washington, D.C,).
125. 448 U.S. 160 (1980).
126. 458 U.S. 832 (1982).
127. 484 U.S. 997 (1988) (summary affirmance).
128. Central MaclL Co., 448 U.S. at 164-66.
129. Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., 458 U.S. at 839-45. The Ramah case also is notable for what
the Court did not hold. The Solicitor General in an amicus brief in Ramnah urged invalidation of
the state tax under a new formulation of the Indian Commerce Clause, one making "on-
reservation activities involving the resident tribe... presumptively beyond the reach of State
law," and placing a burden "on the State to demonstrate that its intrusion into reservation affairs
is either condoned by Congress or justified by a compelling need to protect legitimate State
inteiests." Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Urging Reversal, Ramnah-Navajo Sch. Bd.
(No 80-2162) (dated Jan. 25, 1982), available in LEXIS, Genfed Library, Briefs File [hereinafter
Federal Amicus Brief]. The Court rejected this argument, stating that "[wle do not believe it
necessary to adopt this new approach." Ramah, 458 U.S. at 846.
130. Crow Tribe, 484 U.S. at 997.
131. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 338-43 (1983).
132. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 214-22 (1987).
133. Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 725-35 (1983).
134. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 186 (1989).
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recognized that this approach provides precious little guidance to states or
tribes.'35 This result was inevitable, given that the Court settled for a fact-
specific, case-by-case approach for resolving disputes over application of state
law on Indian reservations. The uncertainty generated by the Court's approach
has been exacerbated by what can only be characterized as inconsistencies in
its application of its own particularized inquiry test. The Court has failed to
fashion consistent rules for measuring the federal, state, and tribal interests
that are weighed in the particularized inquiry calculus. The Court's treatment
of each of these interests will be examined in turn.
A. Federal Interest
The Court has found state law preempted where it was inconsistent with
a comprehensive scheme of federal regulation of some aspect of relations
between Indians and non-Indians. However, the Court's assessment of what
constitutes comprehensive regulation has varied. The clearest example of
comprehensive federal regulation was in Bracker, where federal statutes and
regulations governed the smallest details of tribal timber harvesting, and
where the tribal timber sale operation was effectively conducted by the federal
Bureau of Indian Affairs.'36 But the Court also deemed federal regulation
comprehensive in Mescalero - where federal involvement was limited to
approving tribal hunting ordinances, providing advice on tribal bag limits and
hunting seasons, and stocking fish and elk on tribal lands.'37 Federal
regulation was deemed comprehensive also in Central Machinery, where the
Court focused on the federal government's long history of control over Indian
traders despite the fact that the merchant involved in the case was not
federally licensed and thus was not subject to such controls. 3
This would make sense but for the stark contrast provided by the Court's
decision in Cotton Petroleum. In Cotton Petroleum, the Court found federal
regulation of mineral leasing pursuant to the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of
1938 to be "extensive" but not sufficiently comprehensive to assume
preemptive proportions.'39 Yet the scheme of federal regulation in Cotton
Petroleum approached the level of detail of the federal timber regulations
135. Justice Rehnquist in particular has lamented that the "general question [of the validity
of state law on Indian reservations] has occupied the Court many times in the recent past, and
seems destined to demand its attention over and over again until the Court sees fit to articulate,
and follow, a consistent and predictable rule of law." Rama Navajo Sch. Bd., 458 U.S. at 847
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian
Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 176 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("I am convinced that a well-defined body of principles is essential in order to end the need for
case-by-case litigation which has plagued this area of the law for a number of years.").
136. See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 145-48 (1980).
137. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. at 338-39.
138. Central Mach. Co. v. Arizona St. Tax Comm'n, 448 U.S. 160, 163-65 (1980).
139. Cotton Petroleum Corp., 490 U.S. at 186.
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found comprehensive in Bracker, and certainly created a much greater federal
presence than the handful of services provided by the federal government in
Mescalero.' After Cotton Petroleum, it is unclear what level of federal
involvement amounts to comprehensive regulation.
Cotton Petroleum also raised questions about what level of generality the
Court will utilize in conducting its preemption inquiry. The plaintiff in Cotton
Petroleum sought to demonstrate that state taxes were inconsistent with the
Indian Mineral Leasing Act based on the inclusion in the act's legislative
history of a letter from the Secretary of the Interior stating, "It is not believed
that the present [pre-Act] law is adequate to give the Indians the greatest
return from their property.''. Based on this sentence, Cotton Petroleum
Corporation argued that the act "embodies a broad congressional policy of
maximizing revenues for Indian tribes."'" Justice Stevens, writing for the
Court, dismissed this argument:
There is nothing remarkable in the proposition that, in authorizing
mineral leases, Congress sought to provide Indian tribes with a
profitable source of revenue. It is however quite remarkable,
indeed unfathomable in our view, to suggest that Congress
intended to remove all state-imposed obstacles to profitability by
attaching to the Senate and House reports a letter from the
Secretary that happened to include the phrase "the greatest return
from their property."'43
The Court's response might have had more force had not Justice Marshall,
writing for another majority seven years earlier in Ramah, drawn just the
opposite conclusion from an equally general statement that "happened" to be
in a federal statute. Marshall found that Congress intended to remove all
state-imposed obstacles to Indian education when it included in the Indian
Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975 the statement that
the federal government sought to provide Indians with a "quantity and quality"
of education that would allow Indian children to succeed." Justice Marshall
wrote that a state gross receipts tax "necessarily impedes the clearly expressed
140. Under the Indian Mineral Leasing Act, the federal government in Cotton Petroleum
controlled notice and bidding procedures for tribal mineral lease sales, information requirements
for bidders, size and duration of leases, manner of payment of rent and royalties, bond
requirements imposed on lessees, initiation of operations, and conservation of resources, Id. at
186 n.16. The Court purported to distinguish the impact of this scheme of regulation from that
in Bracker based on the state's provision of services in Cotton Petroleum. Id. at 185-86.
However, as discussed later, see infra notes 154-56 and accompanying text, mere provision of
some services by the state has not proven dispositive in other cases.
141. Id. at 178.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 179.




federal interest in promoting the 'quality and quantity' of educational
opportunities for Indians by depleting the funds available for the construction
of Indian schools.' 45 Thus, a statement of general congressional intent was
deemed sufficient to preempt state taxation in Ramah, but not in Cotton
Petroleum.
An even starker contrast to Cotton Petroleum is provided by Central
Machinery Co., where the Court found a state tax to be preempted by the
mere existence of Indian trader statutes, not by any inconsistency with a
particular federal policy expressed even in general terms within them.'"
Justice Stewart, writing in dissent, expressed mystification at the Court's
departure from its statement in Moe that "[e]nactments of the federal
government passed to protect and guard its Indian wards only affect the
operation, within the [reservation,] of such state laws as conflict with the
federal enactments."' 7 Where preemption of state law sometimes requires
a specific statement of congressional intent, sometimes requires a general
statement of congressional intent, and sometimes requires no statement at all,
it becomes exceedingly difficult to draw conclusions.
B. Tribal Interest
As with federal interests, the Court has contradicted itself with regard to
what level of tribal interest suffices to inform the judicial preemption analysis.
Except where application of state law "infringe[s] on the right of reservation
Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them,"'" tribal sovereignty
does not itself displace state law under the Court's approach. Rather, it plays
into the particularized inquiry analysis only by "provid[ing] an important
'backdrop' against which vague or ambiguous enactments must always be
measured."'4 In most of the Court's recent cases, general notions of tribal
sovereignty provided such a backdrop. It was not necessary for a tribe
traditionally to have exerted control over a particular activity for the backdrop
to exist with regard to that activity.'1
The Court in Cotton Petroleum and Rice v. Rehner departed from that
method of analysis, finding no tribal sovereignty to inform the particularized
145. Id. at 842. Marshall used the phrase "quality and quantity" in his discussion, though
the statutory language is "quantity and quality."
146. Central Mach. Co. v. Arizona St. Tax Comm'n, 448 U.S. 160, 165 (1980).
147. Id. at 167 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (quoting Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai
Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 483 (1976)).
148. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
149. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980).
150. See, e.g., California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202,217-22 (1987)
(finding state gambling laws inapplicable to Cabazon Band despite absence of tradition of Indian
authority over bingo games); Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., 458 U.S. at 834 (reading statutes against
backdrop of tribal sovereignty despite fact that Navajo school project at issue was first in modem
times).
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inquiry analysis in the absence of a tradition of tribal control over the specific
activity at issue. Thus, in Rice the Court applied California's liquor license
law to an on-reservation liquor retailer based in part on a finding that
"tradition simply has not recognized a sovereign immunity or inherent
authority in favor of liquor regulation by Indians."'' In Cotton Petroleum,
the Court's finding that New Mexico's oil and gas production taxes applied to
mineral lessees of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe was partly based on a finding
that "[t]here is . . . simply no history of tribal independence from state
taxation of these lessees to form a 'backdrop' against which the 1938 [Indian
Mineral Leasing Act] must be read."'52 By requiring a history of tribal
authority over a given activity in certain cases, the Court threatens to severely
limit the reach of tribal sovereignty. 3 More significantly for the purposes
of this discussion, by imposing such a requirement at times and not imposing
it at other times, the Court introduces yet another element of uncertainty into
its particularized inquiry analysis.
C. State Interest
The Court seemed to establish a rule to govern the state interest element
of the particularized inquiry analysis in Colville when it said that the states'
"legitimate governmental interest in raising revenues . . . is . . . strongest
when the [state] tax is directed at off-reservation value and when the taxpayer
is the recipient of state services."'" Yet the Court has not adhered to this
foLmulation, at times invalidating state taxation despite a significant state role
in the activity at issue. Thus, in Central Machinery Co., a non-Indian
equipment corporation was held immune from state tax for sales to on-
reservation Indians despite the fact that the corporation was chartered by the
sutte and did business in the state at large.55 In Montana v. Crow Tribe, the
Court summarily affirmed a Ninth Circuit decision invalidating application of
Montana's severance and gross proceeds taxes to tribal coal despite the state's
provision of numerous services to miners and others involved in coal
151. Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 722 (1983).
152. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 182 (1989).
153. One commentator has characterized the Court's approach to tribal sovereignty in Rice
and Cotton Petroleum as reflecting "a menagerie theory of Indian law that treats Indian
reservations as historic human zoos[.]" ROBERT N. CLINTON 1T AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 561
(1991).
[T]he Rice analysis ... locks Indian tribes into historical conceptions of their
sovereignty and precludes Indian polities from evolving to meet the new demands
of modem tribal societies. Indian tribes, like all societies and governments, are
continually evolving as they cope with new and changing internal and external
demands.
Id. at 560.
154. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134,
157 (1979).
155. Central Mach. Co. v. Arizona St. Tax Comm'n, 448 U.S. 160, 161 (1980).
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production, its treatment of pollution and disposal of solid wastes from coal
mining, and its contribution of $500,000 to build a road used by employees
and suppliers of a tribal coal mine.
56
The contrast, once again, is provided by Cotton Petroleum, where suddenly
the Court found provision of state services to be dispositive of the
particularized inquiry analysis. In Cotton Petroleum, the Court found the
state's provision of $89,384 worth of services to Cotton Petroleum Corporation
over a five-year period, and its regulation of the spacing and mechanical
integrity of wells, to justify imposing taxes amounting to eight percent of the
corporation's production value.'57 The Court also referred to the fact that
New Mexico provided general services to both the Jicarilla Tribe and Cotton
Petroleum costing about $3 million per year.55 The Court failed, however,
to explain how the provision of such general services in Cotton Petroleum
assumed greater significance than it did in Ranah, where the Court dismissed
the state's argument "that the significant services it provides to the Ramah
Navajo Indians justify the imposition of [its] tax" on the ground that the
benefits were not "in any way related to the construction of schools on Indian
land." 59 As with the federal and Indian interests involved in the
particularized inquiry analysis, the Court has failed to treat the state interest
component consistently.
The fact-specific particularized inquiry test creates uncertainty in cases
involving commerce between Indians and non-Indians. Inconsistent
application of the test compounds that uncertainty. Without question, the
Court has departed from the Framers' intent that the Indian Commerce Clause
serve as an exclusive commitment to Congress of the power to regulate
relations between Indians and non-Indians. But the Court has undone the
Framers' intent in an even more fundamental way. In the broadest sense, the
Framers saw the Indian Commerce Clause as a remedy for the uncertainty that
had crippled federal Indian policy in the preconstitutional era. The Supreme
Court's particularized inquiry jurisprudence has resurrected the very
uncertainty that the Framers sought to banish. The Court has essentially
"blown the dust off' of Article IX of the Articles of Confederation. Today,
as under Article IX, the limit of state authority over commerce between
Indians and non-Indians is a matter of conjecture, and one about which federal
and state officials and Indian leaders frequently disagree. And today, as under
Article IX, that uncertainty frustrates federal Indian policy. It is, of course,
156. Montana v. Crow Tribe, 484 U.S. 997 (1988) (summarily affirming Crow Tribe v.
Montana, 819 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1987)); Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 207 n.l 1(Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
157. Cotton Petroleum Corp., 490 U.S. at 185-86.
158. Id.
159. Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. v. New Mexico Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 845 n.10
(1982).
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no longer the case - as it was in the preconstitutional era - that federal
Indian policy is frustrated because of doubts about the federal government's
power vis-.-vis state power. It is well settled that federal power over Indian
affairs is plenary."w The modern frustration of federal Indian policy is more
subtle.
Since passage of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,"6t the federal
government's Indian policy has focused on encouraging tribal self-government
and independence."6  The Supreme Court's particularized inquiry
jurisprudence creates incentives that stand in tension with that federal goal.
Tribes are encouraged by Congress to assume control of institutions that for
years have been administered by the federal government, yet they are
effectively warned by the Court that, as they step out from under the
protective shield of federal regulation, their dealings with non-Indians - i.e.,
Indian commerce in the most fundamental sense of the term - will become
vulnerable to state taxation and regulation." The Court could have
facilitated Congress's Indian policy by providing a clear rule for states and
tribes to follow in working out their legal relationships with one another. The
Indian Commerce Clause as Madison and Worcester conceived of it sets out
just such a rule. Instead, the Court has given Indian tribes the particularized
inquiry test and with it the incentive to hold tight to the federal presence in
thair affairs. Thus, Indians face a Court-imposed pressure to remain in some
sense as they were 100 years ago - "wards of the nation. ' "
IV. The Understanding of the Framers in the Modem Era
Despite the strong evidence that the Framers intended an Indian Commerce
Clause far more potent than the one that survives today, the question none the
less arises, "Why do we care?" After all, much has happened since Madison
and others drafted the clause. Indian affairs, which at that time was a major
item on the national agenda, is now a minor blip on the national screen. Is it
necessary or even wise, one may ask, to bind modern federal Indian policy
to an eighteenth century understanding of Indian relations with non-Indians,
to create, as one commentator described it, "the dilemma of transposing
160. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
161. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1989).
162. See, e.g., Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. No.
93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 450a and scattered sections of 25, 42, and 50
U.S.C. app.) (providing for strengthening of tribal control over federal Indian programs such as
education assistance programs).
163. The Solicitor General in his Ramah amicus brief noted "the awkward tension created
by the focus on the pervasiveness of federal regulations as the principal barrier to State assertions
of jurisdiction in a day when the Political Branches are committed to encouraging tribal self-
government, in part by loosening federal control of reservation affairs." Federal Amicus Brief,
supra note 129, at 13.




ancient tribal traditions - wilderness principles to most white Americans
into a technological age?"'"
The answer, as one may have guessed at this stage of the discussion, is that
it is both necessary and wise. That it is necessary is demonstrated by the
frustration of federal Indian policy that inheres in the Court's current
approach. That it is wise is demonstrated by two additional points. First,
while relations between Indians and non-Indians certainly have undergone
dramatic changes since 1787, the understanding of the Framers in this area is
not wholly out of step with the modem world. The Framers did not arrive at
their conception of exclusive federal control over Indian policy based on a
vision of Indian tribes as distant sovereigns whose affairs implicated few state
concerns. While certainly many Indian tribes in 1787 existed far west of the
boundaries of any of the original states, the ideas of Madison and Franklin
were informed by the contemporary reality of states holding Indian territory
within their borders, as illustrated by the preconstitutional conflicts in New
York, Georgia, and North Carolina.'" Thus, in some respects, the situation
of Arizona or Montana today does not vary so greatly from that of Georgia
or New York in 1787. The Indian policy notions of the Framers are not
inherently anachronistic.
Second, by committing to Congress the exclusive power to regulate
commerce with the Indians, the Framers did not freeze federal Indian policy
in time. They simply provided that if changes in circumstances necessitate
changes in Indian policy, it is for Congress to make those changes. This is
hardly a startling concept, and it should not cause great concern for advocates
of either tribal or state interests. The history of United States Indian policy
is largely one of congressional reactions to altered circumstances. From the
Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790,67 passed to shore up the new
government's exclusive control over Indian affairs in an era when Indians still
posed a military threat to the nation, through the removal treaties signed with
many Eastern tribes in the nineteenth century," to the General Allotment
Act of 1887' and its assimilation agenda, and finally to the modem
encouragement of self-determination, congressional Indian policy has tracked
shifting societal demands and the rise, fall, and rise again of tribal sovereignty
throughout the nation's history.'7 During this period Congress has also
considered the needs of states that hold Indian country within their borders to
165. WILKINSON, supra note 76, at 25.
166. See supra notes 46-61 and accompanying text.
167. ch. 33, t Stat. 137.
168. See, e.g., Treaty with the Cherokee, Dec. 29, 1835, U.S.-Cherokee Nation, 7 Stat. 478
(removing Cherokees from tribal lands to Indian Territory of eastern Oklahoma).
169. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-
334, 339, 341-342, 348-349, 381 (1988)).
170. The cycle of federal Indian policy from colonial times to the present, and its impact on
modem federal Indian law, is traced in WILKINSON, supra note 76, at 7-23.
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assert power over Indians when state interests were implicated. Thus, for
example, Public Law 280, enacted in 1953 and amended in 1968, specifically
grants certain states jurisdiction over criminal and civil matters involving
Indians, and provides all states with a mechanism by which such jurisdiction
may be obtained.'
There is ample reason to believe Congress would respond similarly to
changed circumstances and state concerns if the Court held fast to the
Worcester approach by imposing the Indian Commerce Clause as a barrier to
state assertions of power. Congress's treatment of gambling on Indian
reservations provides a clear example of its willingness and ability to do so.
In Cabazon, the Court held that the State of California could not apply its
gambling laws to bingo games operated by the Cabazon Band of Mission
Indians." States responded with fears that unregulated tribal gaming would
compete with non-Indian gaming operations and state lotteries, and that tribal
gaming operations would succumb to infiltration by organized crime.' In
response, Congress in 1988 passed the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act,
74
which authorizes the most serious forms of gambling, such as blackjack and
slot machines, only where legal under both state and tribal law and where
authorized by a state-tribal compact. Cabazon illustrates Congress's ability to
provide for state jurisdiction over Indian commerce where legitimate state
interests are at stake. There is no reason to believe the Cabazonllndian
Gaming Regulatory Act model could not be employed to deal with other
aspects of relations between Indians and non-Indians that raise significant state
concerns.
Thus, Justice McLean was right in the most general sense. Federal Indian
law must change to meet changes in society. But it is the approach taken by
Chief Justice Marshall's Worcester opinion that accords both with the
Constitution as the Framers intended and with the goals of modern federal
Indian policy. Where federal Indian law needs to be changed to address state
concerns, it is for Congress - not the Supreme Court - to make such
changes.
171. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (known generally as "Public Law 280").
172. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 221-22 (1987).
173. CLINTON Er AL., supra note 153, at 303.
174. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (Supp. 1 1989).
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